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Lecture
THE ARCHITECTURE OF INNOVATION
LAWRENCE LESSIG†
Every society has resources that are free and resources that are
controlled. A free resource is one that anyone equally can take; a con-
trolled resource one can take only with the permission of someone
else. E=MC
2 is a free resource. You can take it and use it without the
permission of the Einstein estate. 112 Mercer Street, Princeton, is a
controlled resource. To sleep at 112 Mercer Street requires the per-
mission of the Institute for Advanced Study.
A time is marked not so much by the ideas that are argued about,
but by the ideas that are taken for granted. The character of an era
hangs on what one need not question; the power in a particular mo-
ment runs with the notions that only the crazy would draw into doubt.
Sometimes that is just fine. I’m happy the question of infanticide
is off the table; how extraordinarily tedious it would be if we regularly
had to debate whether we wanted to be a democracy. In the language
of computer programming, it is a great and valuable thing that certain
ideals get compiled into social life. It is an advantage that everything
need not at every moment be interpreted.
But sometimes a society gets stuck because of an idea it can’t
quite question, or dislodge. Sometimes the idea “sticks” the society.
And when that happens, the hardest part of political action—the
hardest part of changing an aspect of society—is to get people to see
Copyright © 2002 by Lawrence Lessig. 
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how this taken-for-granted idea might be wrong. To get people to be-
lieve that there might be something contestable about what seemed
unquestionable, or even to get them to see that the story is more
complex than they believed.
And so it is with us.
We live in an era when the idea of property is just such a
thought, or better, just such a non-thought; when the importance and
value of property is taken for granted; when it is impossible, or at
least for us, very hard, to get anyone to entertain a view where prop-
erty is not central; when to question the universality and inevitability
of complete propertization is to mark yourself as an outsider. As an
alien.
I don’t mean the debate about commodification crystallized by
feminism, or a debate about whether we conceive of social relations
as a kind of property right. That is a fundamentally contested dis-
course, rich with possibility and profoundly important.
I mean something much more mundane and simple. I mean the
question of property in resources. Or, more precisely, the question of
whether resources should be controlled—or how they should be con-
trolled.
For about this question, there is apparently no debate. As Yale
Professor Carol Rose puts it, we live in a time when the view is that
“the whole world is best managed when divided among private own-
ers.”
1 The most creative minds in public policy turn their attention to
how best to divide resources up. The assumption is that well-divided
resources will always work best.
We have this view—this taken-for-granted, background view—
because for the last hundred years, we’ve debated a related question,
and that debate has come to an end. For the last hundred years, the
question exciting political philosophy has been which system of con-
trol works best. Should resources be controlled by the state, or con-
trolled by the market? And this question, we all rightly believe, has
been answered. In all but a few cases, for a wide range of reasons, we
know this: that the market is a better tool for controlling resources
than the state. That between the two, there is no real debate.
1. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 712 (1986).LESSIG IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/03/02 12:07 PM
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But this confidence obscures a distinct and more basic question.
This certainty about the superiority of the market to the state leads us
to ignore an issue that comes before. Not the question of which sys-
tem of control is best for any given resource, but instead the ques-
tion—should a resource be subject to control at all. Not the market
versus the state, but controlled versus free.
If communism versus capitalism was the struggle of the twentieth
century, then control versus freedom will be the debate of the twenty-
first century. If our question then was how best to control, our ques-
tion now will become whether to control. What would a free resource
give us that controlled resources do not? What is the value in avoid-
ing systems of control?
Now, this is a hard question to ask at Duke. It’s actually a hard
question to ask anywhere, as it usually elicits a sheeplike stare among
most in the audience. But it is particularly hard to ask here because
here it’s been asked, and answered, many times before.
The controlled versus free debate gets reborn within law in an
essay about the public domain, penned by Professor David Lange.
2
The paradox between the controlled and the free is crystallized in the
first great book of the information era, by one who has romantically
denied the romance in authorship, Professor James Boyle.
3 And the
struggle to preserve internationally the space of the free in the core of
science and the periphery has at its center the energy of Professor
Jerome Reichman.
4
And so here is the real struggle of one invited to Duke to speak
of things learned from Duke: The exercise quickly feels less like a lec-
ture, and more like an exam. At each moment I feel myself pulled to
look up for correction or scoring; I sit spinning at my desk wondering
whether there is anything new to say to a school that reminds us
2. David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW  & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147
(Autumn 1981).
3. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996).
4. J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatent-
able Innovations, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743 (2000) [hereinafter Reichman, Of Green Tulips]; J.H.
Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at a Crossroads: Recent Development and Their
Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793 (1999); Pamela Samuelson,
Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protec-
tion of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994).LESSIG IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/03/02 12:07 PM
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about how much of the old there is in everything new. And then, for a
moment, I’m relieved by the thought that if I say nothing new, then
you all will feel at least vindicated in your view of how little new there
is in the work of any author, or at least this author.
But here’s the way I want to take your arguments, and say some-
thing new. Put most abstractly, I want to translate your arguments
into space; to place them within an architecture. And then to demon-
strate the points you’ve already made through the machines we’ve
come to know. Through the machines that have defined the potential
for a kind of freedom that we, as a culture, have not known for a very
long time.
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
Professor Yochai Benkler of New York University School of
Law is a theorist of free communication who says to think about a
system of communication divided among three layers.
5 These layers
interconnect; each depends upon the other; any communication de-
pends upon all three.
6
At the bottom of these three, there is the physical layer—the
wires that connect the phones or the computers; the cable across
which television might be broadcast; above that, the logical layer—
the system that controls who gets access to what, or what gets to run
where; and above that, the content layer—the stuff that gets said or
written within any given system of communication.
Now, each of these layers in principle could be controlled or free.
They would be free if they were organized in a commons—organized
so that anyone could get access or equal terms, whether they had to
pay (a fixed and neutral charge) or not. They would be controlled if
they were the property of someone else—someone who had a right to
exclude, or to decide whether to grant access based upon his or her
own subjective reasons.
Depending on whether these layers are free, or are controlled,
the communications system that gets built differs.
5. Yochai Benkler, From Consumer to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation
Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 562–63 (2000).
6. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 23–26 (2001) (explaining the application of the layers approach to the
Internet).LESSIG IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/03/02 12:07 PM
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Consider four possibilities as we vary whether each of these lay-
ers is owned or free.
Speakers’ Corner. Orators and loons gather every Sunday in
Hyde Park’s Speakers’ Corner to rage about something or nothing at
all. It has become a London tradition. It is a communication system
organized in a specific way. The physical layer of this communication
system (the park) is a commons; the logical layer (the language used)
is also a commons. And the content layer (what these nuts say) is
their own creation. It too is unowned. All three layers in this context
are free; no one can exercise control over the kinds of communica-
tions that might happen here.
Madison Square Garden. Madison Square Garden is another
place where people give speeches. But Madison Square Garden is
owned. Only those who pay get to use the auditorium; and the Gar-
den is not obligated to take all comers. The physical layer is therefore
controlled. But like Speakers’ Corner, both the logical layer of the
language and the content that gets uttered is not controlled in the
context of the Garden. They too remain free.
The Telephone System. Before the breakup, the telephone system
was a single-unitary system. The physical infrastructure of this system
was owned by AT&T; so too was the logical infrastructure, which de-
termined how and to whom you could connect. But what you said on
an AT&T phone (within limits at least) was free: The content of the
telephone conversations was not controlled, even if the physical and
logical layer underneath were.
Cable TV. Finally, think of cable TV. Here the physical layer is
owned in the form of the wires that run the content into your house.
The logical layer is owned—only the cable companies get to decide
what runs into your house. And the content layer is owned—the
shows that get broadcast are copyrighted shows. All three layers are
within the control of the cable TV company; no communications
layer, in Professor Benkler’s sense, remains free.
This then is the range. A communications system, and hence, a
system for innovation, could be any of the four, or, of course, more
than these four. But these four set the range that will best help us un-
derstand a very specific example: The Internet.LESSIG IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/03/02 12:07 PM
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It is commonplace to think about the Internet as a kind of com-
mons. It is less commonplace to actually have an idea what a com-
mons is.
7
By a commons I mean a resource that is free. Not necessarily
zero cost, but, if there is a cost, it is a neutrally imposed or equally
imposed cost.
Central Park is a commons:
8 an extraordinary resource of peace-
fulness in the center of a city that is anything but; an escape and ref-
uge that anyone can take and use without the permission of anyone
else.
The public streets are a commons: on no one’s schedule but your
own, you enter the public streets, and go in any direction you wish.
You can turn off of Broadway onto Fifty-second Street at any time,
without a certificate or authorization from the government.
Fermat’s Last Theorem is a commons: a challenge that anyone
could pick up and complete, as Andrew Wiles, after a lifetime of
struggle, did.
Open source, or free software, is a commons: the source code of
Linux, for example, lies available for anyone to take, to use, to im-
prove, to advance. No permission is necessary; no authorization may
be required.
These are commons because they are within the reach of mem-
bers of the relevant community without the permission of anyone
else. They are resources that are protected by a liability rule rather
than a property rule. Professor Reichman, for example, has suggested
that some innovation be protected by a liability rule rather than a
property rule.
9 The point is not that no control is present, but rather
that the kind of control is different from the control we grant to prop-
erty.
The Internet is a communication system. It too has these three
layers. At the bottom, the physical layer, are wires and computers,
7. See generally id. (discussing the idea of the commons in intellectual property theory).
8. I used Central Park, Fermat’s Last Theorem, and open source as examples of commons
in an Address Before the First Amendment and the Media Symposium at the Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law on February 9, 1999. For the full text of this lecture, see Lawrence Lessig,
Commons and Code, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 405 (1999).
9. See generally Reichman, Of Green Tulips, supra note 4 (arguing that protecting small,
subpatentable innovations with a liability rule rather than a property rule would yield a net
benefit to society).LESSIG IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/03/02 12:07 PM
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and wires linking computers. These resources are owned. The owners
have complete control over what they do with their wires or comput-
ers, or wires linking computers. Property governs this layer.
On top of the physical layer is a logical layer—the protocols that
make the Net run. These protocols are many, all chucked into a single
box called TCP/IP. Their essence is a system for exchanging da-
tagrams, but we miss something important about the system if we fo-
cus exclusively on the essence.
For at the core of this logical layer is a principle of network de-
sign. At the core of the Internet’s design is an ideal called “end-to-
end” (e2e). First articulated by network architects Jerome Saltzer,
David Reed, and David Clark,
10 e2e says to build the network so that
intelligence rests in the ends, and the network itself remains simple.
Simple networks, smart applications.
The reason for this design was simple. With e2e, innovation on
the Internet didn’t depend upon the network. New content or new
applications could run regardless of whether the network knew about
them. New content or new applications would run because the net-
work simply took packets of data and moved them along. The funda-
mental feature of this network design was neutrality among packets.
The network was simple, or “stupid,” in David Isenberg’s sense,
11 and
the consequence of stupidity, at least among computers, is the inabil-
ity to discriminate. Innovators thus knew that, if their ideas were
wanted, the network would run them; that this network was archi-
tected never to allow anyone to decide what would be allowed.
This means that this layer of this network—this feature of the
network that distinguished it from all that had been built before—
built this network into a commons. One was free to get access to this
network and share its resources. The protocols were designed for shar-
ing, not exclusive use.  Discrimination, which lies at the heart of a
property system, was not possible in e2e. This system was coded to be
free. That was its nature.
Thus, on top of a physical layer that is controlled rests a logical
layer that is free. And then, on top of this free layer is a content layer
that is both free and controlled.
The free part is all of the content that effectively rests in the
public domain. The facts, data, abandoned property, undiscovered
10. LESSIG, supra note 6, at 34–35.
11.I d .  at 38. David Isenberg was an engineer at Bell Labs. He advocated “stupid” tele-
phone networks, earning him great support on the web, but not from his employers. Id.LESSIG IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/03/02 12:07 PM
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theft—this is the content that is open for the taking and that is taken
openly. But it also includes a part dedicated to be open: open source
or free software, dedicated to be free.
This free resource does more than entertain, or build culture; this
free resource teaches the world about how the Net functions, or is
free. For example, every web page both displays and carries its
source, so that its source can be copied and modified for different
displays.
This free content coexists with content that is controlled. Soft-
ware that is sold; digital content—music, movies, greeting cards—that
is controlled. You can link to mp3.com and listen to music that is free;
you can link to amazon.com and read a book that is controlled. The
network doesn’t care much about what linking occurs. It’s neutral
among the linking, and the result of this neutrality is a mix.
This, then, is a picture of the complexity we call the Internet. At
the bottom is a physical layer that is controlled; on top of it is a logical
layer that is free; and on top of both is a content layer that mixes free
and controlled.
This complexity builds a commons. And this commons has been
the location of some of the most extraordinary innovation that we
have seen. Not innovation in just the dotcom sense, but innovation in
the ways humans interact, innovation in the ways that culture is
spread, and most importantly, innovation in the ways in which culture
gets built. The innovation of the Internet—built into its architec-
ture—is an innovation in the ways in which culture gets made. Let the
dotcom era flame out. It won’t matter to this innovation one bit. The
crucial feature of this new space is the low cost of digital creation, and
the low costs of delivering what gets created.
CLOSING COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
Now I have dissected this commons into these layers to help us
see more precisely just how it will be enclosed. So far my message has
been fairly bright; but my brand is pessimism, and so we need a good
dollop of darkness.
And the fact is, darkness here is not hard to find. For though we
have just begun to see how this freedom functions, we are quickly
coming to see how this freedom will be removed. These layers mixingLESSIG IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/03/02 12:07 PM
2002] THE ARCHITECTURE OF INNOVATION 1791
the free and the controlled are quickly becoming layers that simply
mix different kinds of control.
We are in the midst of a process by which, through law and
through technology, these features of this initial architecture are
changing. Because we believe “the whole world is best managed when
divided among private owners,”
12 we are changing the architecture of
the Net to enable it to be divided and controlled; because we believe
“the whole world is best managed when divided among private own-
ers,” we are expanding and reinforcing control over content through
IP law; because we believe, as our ideology says, we are remaking the
Internet to fit this ideology. Without even pausing to understand it;
without taking a moment to see how it might actually work; we are
mapmakers who, upon finding that the city doesn’t quite fit our
map—an extra building here, and river we didn’t expect there—pro-
ceed to remake the city to make sure it fits the map.
Consider these remakings.
I said that the commons that fuels innovation is the commons
that exists at the logical layer of the Net. This is the commons consti-
tuted by the principle of end-to-end; it is the commons that gets built
by a set of protocols that don’t discriminate. It is the neutral platform
upon which innovation happens. And this neutrality is neutrality built
into the code.
But this code is not given. The code governing a network is not
fixed. The code that governs at one time could be replaced by a dif-
ferent code later on. And more importantly, there is nothing that
forces people who connect to the Net to obey the neutrality of the
net. There is no brand called “the Internet” that carries with it a set of
assumptions about openness and balance; there is instead a basic set
of protocols that anyone is free to supplement with protocols added
on top.
Anyone is free to change it, and some important people are
changing it.  One such example is the providers of broadband serv-
ices.
As the Internet moves from the telephones (from modems and
28.8 or 56k connections) to broadband, to fast, always-on connec-
tions, the physical layer across which the Internet travels is different.
12. Rose, supra note 1, at 712.LESSIG IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/03/02 12:07 PM
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The dominant technology today for serving this broadband content is
cable.
Now, as cable converts to make itself open to the Internet, it is
modifying the architecture of the Internet in an important way. While
the essence of the commons of the Internet was neutrality and sim-
plicity, the essence of what the broadband cable Internet will be is the
power to discriminate in content and services. The aim of this form of
Internet access will not be openness and neutral platforms; the aim of
this form of Internet access will be control over the content that gets
played.
For example: Cable companies make a great deal of money
streaming video to television sets. That is the core of their legacy mo-
nopoly power. Some think it would be useful to stream video to com-
puters. Cable companies were not eager to see this form of competi-
tion. So they imposed rules on broadband users—no more than ten
minutes of streaming video could be contracted for at any time.
13
When they were smart, they said they were worried about congestion.
But when they were honest they said something different. Daniel
Somers, of AT&T, said that the company didn’t spend fifty-six billion
dollars on a cable network “to have the blood sucked out of our
vein[s].”
14
Broadband providers will insist that this control is their right—
that nothing should interfere with their right to layer onto the free
logical layer a system of control. And a budding line of First
Amendment doctrine (embraced and pushed by judges in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit) strongly
supports this claim.
15
These cases are Blade-Runner-esque. Remember that one of the
million amazing puzzles in that extraordinary film is the slow recogni-
tion that these machines are human. Well here too, with the cable sys-
tem, it is the increasing recognition that these systems to deliver elec-
tricity are in fact First Amendment speakers. Wires plus a certain
logic produce “the press”; and then into the mix comes the District of
13. LESSIG, supra note 6, at 156–59.
14. David Lieberman, Media Giants’ Net Change: Major Companies Establish Strong Foot-
hold Online, USA TODAY, Dec. 14, 1999, at B2.
15.S e e  Fox Television Stations, Inc., v. Federal Communications Commission and United
States, 280 F.3d 1027, 1045–47 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (accepting the argument that cable stations are
speakers).LESSIG IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/03/02 12:07 PM
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Columbia Circuit eager to bestow on this press long standing First
Amendment power.
And hence we should expect, as the Internet moves to this
broadband, that the rules governing the providers will be different.
Unlike the telephone company, these providers will be allowed to
discriminate; and discriminate, they will; and, when they do, this open
feature of the Internet commons will be removed. Enclosed. Chopped
up and sold off. With the consequence that innovation here will be
different.
CONTROLLING COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
That’s a change at the logical layer—or more precisely, a set of
controls that gets layered on at the logical layer. But the changes are
not just here. More dramatic, less justified, but more likely are
changes at the content layer. These are the changes most remarked
upon here. And hence these will be a bit easier to describe.
The content I want to focus on here is controlled by copyright
law. Ideas, or, more properly, inventions, get controlled by patent
law; context, or the expression of ideas, is regulated by copyright.
Copyright law has changed. Changed. In the sense that becoming
an oak tree is a change of the acorn, modern copyright law is a change
over the copyright law that was.
When the United States was formed, the Constitution gave Con-
gress the power to grant “authors” exclusive rights for their “writ-
ings” for a “limited time” to—as the Constitution expressly states—
“promote progress.”
16 The Promote Progress Clause is unique in the
Constitution’s enumeration of powers—every other clause leaves the
purpose unspecified; only this clause specifies for what the power may
be used.
The first federal copyright statute was enacted in 1790.
17 That Act
regulated the “printing” and “vending” of “map[s], chart[s] and . . .
book[s]” for an initial term of fourteen years.
18 While in principle
anyone could violate the exclusive right to vend, in 1790, there were
only 127 printing establishments in the United States.
19 Copyright was
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
17. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802).
18.I d .  § 1, 1 Stat. at 124.
19. LESSIG, supra note 6, at 106.LESSIG IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/03/02 12:07 PM
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not automatic; registration was required; most of the early registra-
tions were for scientific or instructional texts. Between 1790 and 1799,
13,000 titles were published in America, but only 556 copyright regis-
trations were filed.
20 More than 95% of published work therefore fell
immediately into the public domain—including, of course, 100% of
foreign work. Our outrage at Chinese piracy notwithstanding, we
should not forget that until 1891, foreign copyrights were not pro-
tected in America.
21 We were born, in other words, a pirate nation.
22
Thus the law was slight, as was the actual scope of protection.
Copyright did not protect derivative works; you could translate or
adapt or abridge or set to song copyrighted works, without the per-
mission of the author. The monopoly rights that the 1790 statute
granted were essentially protections against pirate presses. The target
of the regulation was the press that would take an American author’s
book and simply reproduce it without compensation to the original
author. These pirate presses were to focus their energy on stealing
from the British and French; Americans were to be exempted from
the pirate trade.
Copyright has changed. It no longer is limited to maps, charts
and books. It now touches practically any creative work reduced to a
tangible form. It protects music, and performances, and architecture,
and certain design. It protects machines written in words—we call
that software—and words written on machines—we call that the
Internet.
And it no longer protects these creative acts for an initial term of
fourteen years. It protects these creative works for the life of the
author plus seventy years
23—which means, for example, in the case of
Irving Berlin, a term that exceeds 140 years. It protects this work not
contingently; not, that is, upon registration. It protects it, and all crea-
tive work, automatically—for a term that does not have to be re-
newed, for a life that exceeds the author’s.
20.I d .
21. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 13, 26 Stat. 1106, 1110.
22. I discussed the history of copyright law in the Melville V. Nimmer Memorial Lecture at
UCLA on March 1, 2001. For the full text of this lecture, see Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First
Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2001).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).LESSIG IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/03/02 12:07 PM
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And it protects not just against pirate publishers. The scope of
copyright now protects an extraordinarily broad derivative right. The
right to translate, with some works, the right to perform, the right to
adapt to a play, or make a movie—all these are rights that are now in-
cluded within the originally sparse “exclusive right” that the original
copyright act granted.
And finally, because it doesn’t protect only against pirate pub-
lishers, because in 1909 the statute shifted its terms, to speak of
“copies” and not printing,
24 and because the technology of copying
has now exploded to cover just about anything anyone does with a
computer, the reach of this regulation is no longer the 127 publishers
that existed in 1790. The reach of this regulation on the right to speak
extends to the 127 million Americans who today use computers. This
tiny regulation of a tiny proportion of the extraordinary range of
creative work in 1790 has morphed into this massive regulation of
everyone who has any connection to the most trivial of creative
authorship.
No doubt, and I certainly believe, much of the expanse in copy-
right over the past two hundred years was completely justified under
a proper reading of the balance the framers meant to strike. Though
they didn’t protect music, it would be wrong for us not to protect mu-
sic. I realize there are those on the other side—those who note that
while our system of protection has produced Britney Spears and Ma-
donna, the framers’ system of nonprotection produced Beethoven,
and maybe that means the framers were on to something—but I’m
not on the side of free music if free music means artists don’t get paid.
In my view, the issue is not whether artists get paid; the issue is how.
Congress has been correct in its efforts to extend rights to assure art-
ists get paid, so as to assure a sufficient incentive to produce art.
Thus we should notice this expansion not so much to oppose it,
but to recognize its inertia. Control is our direction, and our velocity
has been set. Something big will have to happen if this inertia is to be
checked. Something significant in the culture must block it if the in-
evitable it promises—the inevitable of perfect control—is to be
avoided.
24. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)).LESSIG IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/03/02 12:07 PM
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Instead, something big has happened that has accelerated the
push to perfect control. And paradoxically, that something big that
will push copyright to perfect control is this architecture of freedom
we call the Internet.
For before the Internet, in my humble view, there was little rea-
son to worry about the emergence of control. I realize this is a con-
troversial view here. Professor Lange was lamenting the commons
long before any of us had linked with html.
25 Long before the name
Hilary Rosen became a chatroom slur,
26 Professor Lange was building
outrage at the tendency of IP lawyers to overreach. Indeed, in a pas-
sage from his Reclaiming the Public Domain, Professor Lange cap-
tures the essence of where we are now, with a style and authority that
reminds one of Charles Black’s account of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.
27 Professor Lange tells us what we all know, but reminds us how
the legal system makes it impossible to say what we know:
The defendants, of course, were obliged to take each of these claims
seriously and to respond to them with earnest denials rooted firmly
in law. But I am free to recognize them for the utter nonsense they
are. Legitimate works deserve protection from real threats. But
claims of this kind are so extravagant in relation to the reality from
which in theory they ought to spring that one is tempted not merely
to dismiss them as nonsense, but to suggest in addition that one day
one of them ought to be made the subject of a serious counterclaim
for punitive damages rooted in some sort of tort designed expressly
for the purpose, perhaps to be termed “unconscionable overreach-
ing.”
28
Thus the practice we can’t escape seeing today is, of course, a
practice that others have noticed from time immemorial. The ex-
tremes of the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA)
were not invented by the RIAA. Professor Lange retells in the same
article the extraordinary story of Warner Brothers threatening the
Marx Brothers when Groucho was considering a production to be ti-
tled “A Night in Casablanca.”
29 For, of course, Warner Brothers be-
25. Lange, supra note 2.
26. LESSIG, supra note 6, at 200. As president of RIAA, Hilary Rosen declared that the
industry’s objective was to limit venture capital such that content available on the Internet had
been approved by the industry. Id.
27. Appellants’ Reply Brief, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. Lange, supra note 2, at 166.
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lieved it owned the name “Casablanca,” which inspired Groucho to
respond that he believed, since the Marx Brothers predated Warner
Brothers, that he owned the word “Brothers” and that Warner had
better back off.
30
Yet there is a difference in these blusterings of lawyers today,
and the difference is in the code. Not in the code architected by East
Coast coders—legislators in Washington—but in the code architected
by West Coast coders—the code of software and the control built into
it. The difference is that now, these systems of control can be built
into an architecture that must recognize them; the encodings and con-
trol, as Professor Boyle puts it, following Michael Foucault, get in-
scribed into the wires.
31 And, when this discipline gets encoded into
the wires, then this discipline is bizarrely more important than when it
is simply the overreaching of lawyers. Now the over-reaching of an e-
book that says, “You can read this on a Windows machine, but not on
a Macintosh,” is something more than bluster. It is a set of controls
with the power of mathematics behind it—we call that encryption—
and now these controls have the power of law to defend them—we
call that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
32
This layer of control is new in the game; this layer is exploding
and the law is expanding to back it up. And hence now, just at the
moment that technology could enable a billion lifelike innovations, a
billion iMacs crafting movies by remixing culture from the past, just at
the moment when the technology could make real the idea captured
in an Apple commercial—rip, mix, and burn, after all, as the commer-
cial ends, it is your music—the technology is taking that freedom
away. The very same iMac which Apple tries to sell with this picture
of freedom—rip mix and burn—is encoded with software to handle
DVDs that does not enable the ripping, mixing, or burning of Holly-
wood’s movies. Try to rip, mix, and burn that stuff and the system will
quickly crash. Control of that content has been encoded; and this sys-
tem of “freedom” has been encoded to respect that control.
30.I d .   at 173.
31.S e e  James D. Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwire
Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 201–02 (1997) (describing how technological controls embed-
ded in information could dictate information flow on the Internet); see also Albert Kovacs,
Note, Quieting the Virtual Prison Riot: Why the Internet’s Spirit of “Sharing” Must Be Broken, 51
DUKE L.J. 753, 769–85 (2001) (applying Foucault’s analysis to music sharing on the Internet).
32. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–05, 1301–32
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This is the conflict between two pictures of the future. One, the
future of imperfect control at the content layer—music that gets
ripped, mixed, and burned; the other, the future of perfect control—
of DVDs that get ripped, mixed, and burned only as Jack Valenti,
President and CEO of the Motion Picture Association of America,
allows. And my bet is with the future of perfect control. For as well as
an infrastructure that can have control layered onto it—the Inter-
net—and as well as code that can build control into content—copy-
right management regimes—and as well as law that will back up the
control that gets built into content that gets served across this infra-
structure—the DMCA—the more important reason to bet on a future
of control is culture. It isn’t the West Coast code that will matter
most; it isn’t the East Coast code that will make the difference; the
real issue is the culture, and its code; the real power is in a set of ideas
that is still taken for granted.
CONCLUSIONS
For this is what I spoke of at the start, and it is this that will de-
fine the end. Ideas that are taken for granted; that are unquestioned
in this culture; that to question, would render you an alien; these
ideas are the ideas that will make control the future.
For these ideas take for granted the property in intellectual
property. These ideas have lost the distinction that our framers made
clear—by speaking as they did, not of intellectual property, but of
monopolies and exclusive rights. That’s what a copyright or patent
is—a government backed monopoly, not over a rivalrous or scarce re-
source like land or apples or heated homes, but over a nonrivalrous
resource that the Enlightenment taught us should be shared among
more than the Church. IP is not P, but this truth is lost on us.
And so deeply is it lost that we don’t even notice the irony it
produces. We speak of a commons as if it is only a tragedy; we recall
the public domain as if it were simply an echo from some romantic
past; we embrace, as Professor Rose says, the idea that the whole
world is best managed when divided among private owners,
33 and we
proceed to divide the world among private owners. Most Americans
agree with the Walt Disney Corporation that Mickey Mouse is Dis-
ney’s now and forever; they don’t even notice the irony then when
33. Rose, supra note 1, at 712.LESSIG IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/03/02 12:07 PM
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Disney can make millions off of Victor Hugo’s creation, the Hunch
Back of Notre Dame, or Sergei Prokofiev or Pocahontas. So invisible
is public domain that we don’t even see it when it is everywhere
around; so invisible is the idea that the free might matter to creativity,
that when it is enclosed, we are convinced this is progress.
Our future is this: the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-
ment will be read to entitle those who own the wires to change the
logical layer and make it owned as well; the free competition principle
of the Sherman Act will be read (by the same Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, we might notice) to entitle the owner of the platform that most
affects this logical layer (that one company whose name I have not ut-
tered) to code that platform to discriminate as it wants; and the free
culture that we have seen flourish in this commons built by the Inter-
net will be captured and controlled again by those who control most
of the content, and by those who succeed in Congress in expanding
their control from the imperfect to the perfect. And this future of
control will get built by an idea: that property is good, so more prop-
erty is better. It will get sanctioned by a culture that has forgotten dis-
tinction, and that is so blinded by what it has forgotten that it does
not even notice when the most extraordinary innovation that our cul-
ture has seen is built not on an architecture of perfect freedom; not in
a world where every layer is in the commons, but also not on an archi-
tecture where control is the rule. Not, in other words, on an architec-
ture where every layer is owned; but instead, on an architecture that
mixes freedom and control, that built property within a commons,
and that got its life from this mix of property and the commons.
At every layer, we are displacing the free with control, and the
reasons for this displacing are not hard to see. This architecture of in-
novation that we call the Internet threatens the systems of control
that thrived before there was such a thing as the Internet. And those
whose interests are most threatened by this innovation have rallied to
undermine what is special about it.
This is nothing new with the Internet. In his extraordinary work,
The Prince, Niccolo Machiavelli had this to say about innovation:
Such an innovator has as enemies all the people who were doing
well under the old order, and only halfhearted defenders in those
who hope to profit from the new. This halfheartedness derives partly
from fear of opponents who have the law on their side, and partlyLESSIG IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/03/02 12:07 PM
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from human skepticism, since men don’t really believe in anything
new till they have solid experience of it.
34
We allow these changes; they don’t just happen. We stand back
as they occur; they don’t happen in the night. We let them occur be-
cause most of us believe they should; that control is good, better con-
trol is better, and that these systems of control are ways to make sure
the better comes from the good.
It is an attitude and blindness and a pathetic resignation that
permits this change. So enamored we are with the invisible hand, so
convinced we are of the genius of property, so blind we are to what
makes innovation possible, that we allow the undoing of the most sig-
nificant chance for something different than we have ever seen.
When I talk about this loss in other places, most don’t really get
it. They clap politely, and then they ask, What is innovation? You ha-
ven’t defined the good in innovation. What do we lose when control is
the norm? What really is to be gained from freedom?
These are people who can’t imagine a world where culture is
anything else but served on a platter. These are people for whom the
idea of cultural production is only ever associated with the state (as in
China) or the corporation (as in a production department). These are
people who can’t imagine culture being reproduced and recreated by
individuals, or by small groups working together, with a technology
that enables a remaking of culture.
These are people who have not seen the films of Professor
Lange’s students; who have not read the politics in Professor Boyle’s
writings; who have not begun to understand the lesson of the harm to
science taught by Professor Reichman.
These are people who have not been to Duke. And so I come to
Duke to do little more than report on a war we are losing. Of a cul-
ture that can’t see the potential that this architecture presents. Of a
politics that scorns anyone who questions that übervision of perfect
control.
34. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 17 (Robert M. Adams trans., W.W. Norton &
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The irony astounds. We win the cold war against state control so
as to reentrench this system of control in the name of the market. We
fight battles in the name of free speech, only to have those tools
turned over to the arsenal of those who would control speech. We de-
fend the ideal of property, and then confuse its limits, and extend its
reach to a space none of our founders would ever have imagined.
We move through this moment of an architecture of innovation,
to once again an architecture of control. Without notice; without re-
sistance; without a question.
This, you may notice, is a contradiction in our tradition. You
might be tempted to then repeat my favorite line from Professor
Boyle’s book: “I have nothing against contradictions, some of my best
friends are contradictions . . . .”
35
This is a contradiction we should be against. Yet, we, Americans,
are not.
35. BOYLE, supra note 3, at 169.